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The term “executive review” is a bland phrase for a disturbing 
concept.  The concept maintains that an official may lawfully resist the 
command of one who is otherwise a lawful superior in the name of a 
higher law.  The oxymoronic ring to this phrase—lawful resistance to 
lawful authority—hints at a dilemma. 
Within the context of an unambiguous hierarchy, we expect bu-
reaucrats and other executives to carry out unambiguous commands 
given by their superiors.  It seems to violate the essence of bureau-
cratic legality to excuse these officials from their duty to execute the 
will of their acknowledged superiors through the invocation of gauzy 
notions of equality, due process, or similarly vague constitutional 
rhetoric.  However, even the most rigidly constrained official must re-
sist commands that flout ordinary notions of decency:  the Nuremberg 
defense of “just following orders” is unacceptable even for the lowliest 
of enlisted men and women. 
“Just following orders” is indeed the essence of the problem:  
when is just following orders all that justice allows? 
Our collective obsession with the federal Constitution destroys our 
capacity to ask whether it is just to follow orders in an interesting way.  
The three neat federal departments, each with its own Article, vesting 
clause, and chief (unitary or otherwise), make it easy to choose one or 
the other horns of the dilemma uncritically, without really contem-
plating the stakes of the problem. 
Starting from federal assumptions, the departmentalist would ar-
gue that, in ignoring the statute and instead enforcing the higher law 
of the Constitution, the Executive is just following orders—the orders 
given by “We the People” in the Constitution.
1
  After all, the President 
must take care that all of the laws of the nation are faithfully exe-
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cuted—and the Constitution is one of those laws.
2
  Congress does not 
have authority superior to the President; instead, both are inferior 
agents of the People.  Though supreme within their allegedly distinct 
spheres of legislation and execution respectively, each is entitled to 
enforce the Constitution in its own peculiar manner. 
The judicial supremacist can be equally breezy about the special 
duty and province of Article III courts to say what the law is.  She 
would argue that the other two departments must follow judicial 
precedents when they are available and predict what the Court would 
do as best as possible when precedents do not exist.  As a practical 
matter, this means that the President should uphold all of those stat-
utes that the Court has upheld or would likely uphold; moreover, 
when the President is uncertain about what the Court would do, she 
ought to take the necessary steps to ensure expeditious judicial review, 
even if it means enforcing criminal statutes against individuals just to 
make certain that they raise whatever constitutional defenses might be 
available in a judicial forum. 
Norman Williams’s first and most important contribution is simply 
to recognize that, whatever the merits of these two positions as inter-
pretations of the U.S. Constitution, both are hopelessly unpersuasive 
when applied to state constitutions.
3
 
First, consider departmentalism.  In state constitutions, the execu-
tive consists of a menagerie of exotic governmental fauna—not just 
the canonical secretaries of state, comptrollers general, and attorneys 
general (usually elected), but also those state “constitutional agen-
cies,” such as the boards of regents for state universities, game com-
missions, alcoholic beverage commissions, state boards of tax equaliza-
tion, workers’ compensation boards, railway commissions, civil service 
commissions, and civil rights commissions.  Professor Williams makes 
quick and effective work of the notion that all of these entities are 
automatically entitled to disregard state statutes to enforce their own 
notions of constitutionality.
4
  There are simply too many of these offi-
cers, and chaos would ensue should they ignore the controlling state 
statute.  Do all of these “departments” get to ignore any legislation in 
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the name of the state constitution?  And what about counties, cities, 
townships, and other local governments, many of which are frequently 
recognized by state constitutions?  Do they also have an independent 
power to construe the constitution?  It is inconceivable that these 
questions could be answered broadly in the affirmative. 
Professor Williams makes an equally effective case against judicial 
supremacy in the construction of state constitutions.  He argues that 
the actual practice of state courts makes judicial supremacy unten-
able.
5
  If the state courts adopt any doctrine of deference to agency in-
terpretation analogous to Chevron,
6
 then they will give executive offi-
cials the first opportunity to construe statutes.  But the administrative 
task of statutory construction, of course, ordinarily includes constitu-
tional “savings constructions.”
7
  Thus, judicial supremacy is self-
defeating, because the state judiciaries do not wish to rule supreme 
over the meaning of their constitutions. 
The constructive side of Professor Williams’s work is his effort to 
defend a third method—“the legislative model”—for determining 
when agencies should just follow orders from the legislature.
8
  On his 
account, executive review is really just a problem of statutory construc-
tion.  If the statute creating the agency confers authority on the 
agency to construe the state constitution, then the agency has the 
power of executive review.  The natural corollary is that, if an agency 
is created by the state constitution, then the agency’s power of execu-
tive review depends on constitutional rather than statutory law.
9
 
This legislative model has one great strength—and a matching 
weakness—as a method for determining agency powers.  The strength 
is that it focuses one’s attention away from nebulous generalities 
about the essential nature of “executive power” and towards the spe-
cific statutes that govern particular institutions.  But the weakness of 
Professor Williams’s theory is that it tries to elude a genuine policy di-
lemma by invoking legal texts that, in reality, are usually too indeter-
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minate to provide any refuge from the dilemma. 
The problems with any text-based defense of the legislative model 
become apparent in Part IV.B of Professor Williams’ article in which 
he describes “Statutory Indicia of the Delegation of Interpretive Au-
thority.”
10
  Professor Williams does not offer any convincing explana-
tion of his canons.  He notes that procedural formality “is a good 
proxy for such legislative intent” to delegate interpretative authority, 
citing United States v. Mead Corp.
11
  But Mead’s emphasis on procedural 
formality turns out to be controversial.  Justice Scalia denounced the 
idea,
12
 and both the U.S. Supreme Court and lower courts have sig-
naled that procedural formality would be neither necessary nor suffi-
cient for Chevron deference to apply.
13
  Why import it into state law? 
Professor Williams argues that “one would ordinarily expect the 
legislature to require the type of process in which the official could 
amass the necessary information and arguments to perform that task 
[of executive review] in a thorough fashion.”
14
  But this sentence begs 
the critical question:  what makes “formal” procedures such a laudable 
way of acquiring information and arguments?  It is commonplace to 
argue that courts “underenforce” constitutional values precisely be-
cause formal judicial procedures are so cumbersome that they cannot 
confirm the sorts of legislative facts that are relevant for constitutional 
decision making.
15
  The whole point of executive review is to correct 
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this deficiency, not mimic it.  Of course, in a quasi-judicial hearing 
where individual liberty or property is at stake, formality might be re-
quired by constitutional due process.  But, as Professor Williams him-
self notes, official exercise of executive review often does not burden 
such interests.  For instance, it is not obvious how any individual’s 
constitutionally protected liberty interest is burdened by a mayor’s de-
cision to issue a letter requiring the county clerk to issue marriage li-
censes to same-sex couples.
16
  In such a context, why should any for-
mality whatsoever be required in order to permit executive review?
17
 
If formal procedures are no measure of whether an executive is a 
reliable constitutional decision maker, then what about the level of an 
executive’s “discretion”?  The difficulty is that defining executive re-
view in terms of executive discretion is circular:  if an official enjoys 
the power of executive review-–that is, the power to determine 
whether a law violates the state constitution-–then that official will pro 
tanto enjoy policymaking discretion.  The slogan that “ministerial” re-
sponsibilities do not confer the power to question the constitutionality 
of a law,
18
 therefore, begs the question:  is the statutory duty in ques-
tion really “ministerial” given that it might be used to enforce a consti-
tutional norm? 
Given the inadequacies of these canons, Professor Williams might 
say a bit more about pure policy:  quite simply, what sorts of officials 
make good constitutional interpreters?  Consider two values:  democ-
ratic accountability and expertise. 
One reason why one might trust an official to enforce constitu-
tional norms is that the official is a highly visible public figure who is 
likely to accurately interpret the norms and beliefs of the state’s citi-
zens.  As Elena Kagan and David Barron have argued in defending an 
analogous rule to govern the scope of Chevron deference, such a rule 
is normatively justified to the extent that courts seek to protect public 
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accountability rather than fidelity to some nonexistent legislative in-
tent.
19
 
Second, consider the role of expertise.  Constitutional doctrine of-
ten requires courts to make complex empirical judgments.  For in-
stance, determining whether a high school’s curriculum complies with 
the state constitution’s doctrine on educational adequacy requires 
some knowledge of educational policy and assessment standards.
20
  It 
makes sense for courts to rely on state agency experts to implement 
these sorts of empirically complex constitutional norms.  Consider, for 
instance, how heavily the New Jersey Supreme Court relied on the 
state Council on Affordable Housing (COAH) to collect the data nec-
essary to implement the Court’s Mount Laurel doctrine.
21
 
Professor Williams mostly ignores these normative considerations 
of political accountability and expertise, instead focusing on close 
readings of statutes delegating power to executive officials.  To be 
sure, he gleans some big grains of insight through his careful scrutiny 
of text.  It is helpful to note, for instance, that California county clerks 
only have statutory authority to conduct an examination into whether 
the procedural prerequisites of a marriage license have been met—a 
statutory limit of authority that would seem to preclude a clerk’s con-
ducting an “examination” of state constitutional equality norms.
22
  
Sometimes it pays to read the text carefully. 
But not always.  For instance, Mayor Gavin Newsom, the chief ex-
ecutive of the City and County of San Francisco, derives his authority 
from the charter of the City and County of San Francisco,
23
 which de-
rives its authority from article XI, section 5(a) of the California Con-
stitution.  Article XI, section 5(a), in turn, provides that city charters 
can “provide that the city governed thereunder may make and enforce 
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all ordinances and regulations in respect to municipal affairs;” 
though, “in respect to other matters” the chartered cities “shall be 
subject to general laws.”
24
 
Why are the mayor’s efforts to enforce constitutional equality in 
marriage not a “municipal affair”?  Oddly, Professor Williams entirely 
ignores this issue of the mayor’s authority, focusing instead on the 
statutory authority of county clerks and registrars.  Perhaps he avoids 
the topic because his method of closely reading text will not yield 
much persuasive insight into the scope of Mayor Newsom’s authority. 
It is easy to make a textual case that Mayor Newsom’s authority 
concerns “municipal affairs.”  He is not, after all, trying to write a new 
law of marriage—a well-established statewide concern generally re-
garded as beyond municipal power—but instead is simply applying ex-
isting constitutional norms to the existing marriage laws.  The latter 
might seem like an ordinary executive responsibility to take care that 
the laws (all of the laws, including constitutional law) are faithfully 
executed within city limits.  Professor Williams’s argument about the 
special status of constitutional officers also seems to cut in Mayor 
Newsom’s favor.  According to Professor Williams, state governors 
normally should have broader powers of executive review because 
state constitutions confer power on the governor to execute the laws, 
a power that implicitly includes the power to see that the state consti-
tution is faithfully executed.
25
  But state constitutions confer broad 
administrative power on chartered cities as well.  Why, then, cannot 
Mayor Newsom take advantage of his article XI, section 5(a) constitu-
tional grant of power? 
Two obvious answers are that (1) Mayor Newsom lacks democratic 
accountability with the relevant statewide constituency and (2) mu-
nicipal power over marriage would create conflict-of-law chaos.  May-
ors represent voters who could be ideological outliers in the state, es-
pecially if voters segregate themselves by political preferences.  
Mayors’ views, therefore, are unlikely to reflect the median state 
voter’s positions on matters such as same-sex marriage.  Moreover, if 
municipalities adopt radically different views on constitutional equal-
ity in marriage, then one would predict conflict-of-law nightmares.  
Richard Schragger has suggested that these conflicts, generated by dif-
fering municipal rules on marital status, would be manageable be-
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cause “the state court [would] simply apply the relevant state marital 
law as it is dictated by domicile.”
26
  However, the difficulty is not so 
much coming up with abstract rules, but rather coping with the prac-
tical effect of those rules when cross-border mobility increases expo-
nentially.  California has 109 chartered cities in close proximity to 
each other, such that it is frequently easy for the residents of these cit-
ies to change their domicile without changing their employer.
27
  One’s 
visitation rights should not change every time one’s ex moves to the 
suburbs. 
These are fairly obvious reasons why a court might be reluctant to 
embrace mayoral enforcement of constitutional equality in marriage.  
But neither of these practical criteria forms a part of Professor Wil-
liams’s analysis.  This gap suggests a problem with his theory.  An ad-
ministrative agency’s action could pass Professor Williams’s test for 
executive review and yet fail the test of common sense. 
Suppose, for instance, that the Arkansas Game Commission ig-
nores state statutes that limit duck hunting as a way to vindicate hunt-
ers’ Second Amendment right to bear arms.  Such executive review 
seems preposterous because Game Commissioners have no expertise 
in firearms regulation or civil liberties and enjoy little public visibility 
sufficient to make them spokespersons for the state’s median voter.  
Yet such executive review would arguably pass Professor Williams’s leg-
islative model test because the Commissioners are constitutional offi-
cers exercising powers that seem to fall within the literal terms of the 
constitutional text.
28
  Again, the difficulty is that Professor Williams’s 
theory ignores the facts about democratic accountability and expertise 
that most of us would regard as critical. 
In short, Professor Williams’s conclusions are sensible, but he 
does not defend them in terms of the empirical predictions and 
norms that really ought to decide the question.  By focusing on non-
federal institutions, Professor Williams has powerfully diverted the 
discussion of executive review away from the usual discussion of the 
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platonic essence of constitutional interpretation or executive power.  
He has also reminded us that more can be milked out of statutory 
language than is at first readily apparent.  But even so, much remains 
unspoken in the text.  In that textual gap, the only recourse for a can-
did decision maker is to determine sound policy.  Professor Williams’ 
next article on executive review ought to help make that policy de-
termination. 
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